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Developing countries have a great interest in pursuing  Developing countries should therefore give priority to
active domestic competition policy, they conclude, but  using the WTO to improve market access - to further
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Competition  policy has an important  role to play in developing  countries,  both in promoting  a
competitive environment  and in building  and sustaining  public  support for a pro-competitive  policy  stance
by the government.  Liberal trade and investment  policies are a key element of a good competition  policy,
and priority slhould  be given eliminating barriers  to trade and FDI.  However, in many sectors  of the
economy the threat of foreign competition  will remain limited, and there is need to apply competition  law to
ensure  that firms do not behave collusively and that market  power is not exploited.This can and should be
done independently of the WTO-no  international disciplines are needed.
There are a number of potential rationales for international cooperation in the area of competition
law, notably where multi-jurisdictional mergers take place and where welfare-reducing export cartels
cannot be disciplined because the jurisdictions most able to collect evidence have no incentive to do so.
This does not imply an international agreement that could improve global welfare can easily be
negotiated. Given the mercantilist basis of multilateral trade negotiations,  the  WTO is less likely to be a
powerful instrument to encourage adoption of welfare-enhancing  competition rules than it is as a forum
for the abolition of border measures.
The problem is that the agenda is likely to be dominated by market access issues more than
international antitrust. That is to say that the typical dispute is about the interests of major producers in
export markets, and not about ensuring the adoption of competition law that is in the interests of the
economy as a whole. To oversimplify, trade officials from exporting countries want to force competition
officials in importing countries to assist in opening markets. From a bureaucratic politics point of view,
this can give rise to a conflict between competition  or anti-monopoly authorities worldwide and trade
officials. The competition officials are afraid that their main objective of defending economic efficiency
may be made subordinate to trade officials whose aim is to promote exports.
Independent decisions  and actions are required  on the part of developing  countries to ensure that
competition  policies are implemented  that foster a liberal trade and investment  regime, and that action can be
taken under competition  law statutes  to ensure  that markets are contestable.  Multilateral  surveillance and
scrutiny of domestic competition  policy may help in this regard, as it will support  domestic "transparency"
activities that focus attention on the competitive  conditions  that prevail in the economy.  If there is a move to
negotiate on competition  law at the WTO,  the challenge  for developed  as well as developing  countries is to
pull off the same trick that lies at the heart of the GATT,  namely harnessing  the interests of competing
producers to promote the adoption of policies  that are welfare enhancing.
Clearly there is scope for bargaining  outside  the area of competition  law.  The fact that the
competition  agenda is being driven by market  access considerations  does not mean this is the only factor that
could enter into play. Pressure for modifications  in anti-dumping  law and for commitments  by OECD
competition  authorities  to provide assistance  to developing  country  competition  authorities are examples  of
the type of quid pro quo that could be sought. Realism suggests,  however,  that the primary focus should be
on the design of appropriate  national policies. Developing  countries should use the opportunities  offered by
the WTO to implement  a pro-active, broad-based  competition  policy stance as this is in their own interest,
while seeking all the leverage they can to  increase  the contestability  of world markets.Competition Policy, Developing Countries and the WTO
Bernard Hoekman (World Bank) and Peter Holmes (Sussex University)
Competition law (antitrust in US parlance) is increasingly  attracting the attention of trade policy officials
in OECD countries, driven by domestic export interests who argue that anticompetitive practices impede
their ability to sell goods and services in foreign markets. In 1996,  the World Trade Organization (WTO)
created a  Working Group to investigate  the relationship between  trade and competition policies, and
negotiations on this subject may be launched at some point. Views on whether competition law
disciplines should be incorporated into the multilateral trading system vary widely in both the policy and
academic communities. Despite an ever-expanding literature on the subject, the debate remains
contentious; there is no emerging consensus regarding whether and how to address competition issues in
the WTO. This is reflected in the first report issued by the Working Group in late 1998,  which simply
recommended that discussions in the group be continued (WTO 1998a).
In this paper we review the "state of the debate" from a developing country perspective. We start
with some definitions of terms (section 1) and a discussion of the point of view of the main protagonists
at the WTO: the EU, US, Japan and the newly industrialized countries of East Asia (section 2). We then
consider the case for national competition legislation in developing countries (section 3) and their
potential interests in multilateral disciplines in this area (section 4). The major options that may be
pursued at the multilateral level are summarized in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes.
Developing countries have a great interest in implementing an active domestic competition
policy; indeed, in order to minimize the potential negative consequences  of implementing some WTO
Agreements, an appropriately  worded competition law should be developed. This can and should be done
independently of the WTO-no  international  disciplines are needed. However, there are a number of
potential rationales for international cooperation in the area of competition law, notably where multi-
1jurisdictional mergers take place and where welfare-reducing export cartels cannot be disciplined because
the jurisdictions most able to collect evidence have no incentive to do so. This does not imply an
intemational agreement that could improve global welfare can easily be negotiated. Given the mercantilist
basis of multilateral trade negotiations, the  WTO is less likely to be a  powerful instrument to encourage
adoption of welfare-enhancing competition  rules than it is as a forum for the abolition of border
measures. We conclude that priority should be given to pursuit of the traditional market access focus of
the WTO-further  reduction in direct barriers to trade in goods and services. In our view this would have
the greatest immediate beneficial impact on global  welfare, although we are not arguing, as some have
done, that external trade liberalization is by itself sufficient  to curb transnational anti-competitive
behavior.
1.  Defining Terms
National competition law can be defined as the set of rules and disciplines maintained by govemments
relating either to agreements between firms that restrict competition or to the abuse of a dominant
position (including attempts to create a dominant position through merger). A major objective of
competition law in most jurisdictions is efficient resource allocation, and thereby the maximization of
national welfare, by ensuring that the competitive process is not distorted or impeded through the abuse
of dominant positions (either through prohibition or through regulation) or competition-restricting
agreements between competitors that are detrimental to social welfare. Many jurisdictions recognize that
specific agreements between firms that may reduce competition can be efficiency enhancing, and make
allowance for such agreements. Countries vary in the emphasis that is placed on efficiency-many  also
include social objectives and "fairness" considerations in their legislation.1
See  Richardson  (1998)  on the objectives  of competition  law.
2Competition  policy has a much broader domain. It comprises the set of measures and instruments
used by governments that determine the "conditions of competition" that reign on their markets. Antitrust
or competition law is a component of competition  policy. Other components can include actions to
privatize state-owned enterprises, deregulate activities, cut firm-specific subsidy programs, and  reduce
the extent of policies that discriminate against foreign products or producers. Often the competition
policy stance of a government may be determined in part by the international treaties it is a party to,
including e.g., regional integration agreements. A key distinction between competition law and
competition policy is that the latter pertains to both private and government actions, whereas antitrust
rules pertain to the behavior of private entities (firms).
Many dimensions of competition policy are already on the WTO agenda-e.g.,  trade policy,
subsidies, intellectual property protection, market access in services. The focus of the debate in the WTO
is therefore on whether there should be specific rules pertaining to national competition law and its
enforcement.
2.  Perspectives of High-Income Countries
Support for international disciplines in the area of competition law was originally stimulated by US
perceptions that international cartels and the absence or non-enforcement of national competition law
impeded the ability of US firms to contest markets. The US has been arguing for many years that
Japanese corporate groups (Keiretsu) undermine market access for foreign suppliers by buying
predominantly from each other and retaining close vertical linkages between manufacturers, wholesalers
and retailers. In the 1  940s at the time of the negotiations to establish an International Trade Organization
(ITO), the US supported inclusion of a chapter dealing with restrictive business practices, reflecting its
opposition to German cartels and Japanese zaibatsu. More recently the EU has been in the forefront,
arguing that all WTO members must adopt and enforce competition laws. The US appears to be of the
view that it would be preferable to act unilaterally and/or pursue bilateral cooperation (Klein, 1998;
3Janow, 1998). US authorities acknowledge  there is a need for international cooperation. For example,
Assistant Attorney-General Joel Klein has argued that the inability to share confidential information is a
problem: "we must continue to bolster competition laws and enforcement efforts in nations around the
world, and to facilitate the kind of exchanges of confidential information that are essential to coordinated
enforcement activities" (Klein 1995). But the US are not willing to allow their own rules to be
subordinated to an international r6gime of any kind. Its competition authorities do not want to change
their laws in any way or to find themselves fighting market access battles, although US law has begun to
provide for this in certain circumstances.2
US and EU proponents of international  competition rules have a predominantly "market access"
driven agenda. Non-existent or poorly enforced competition laws are argued to hinder access for
exporters by allowing domestic firms to foreclose or greatly increase the cost of entry. Other high-income
countries argue that the main issue from a WTO market access perspective is not competition law and
policy but the use of traditional instruments of contingent protection such as antidumping to restrict
access to markets. This is the position of Japan and other Asian WTO members, most vocally Hong
Kong. Smaller countries, especially developing ones, have also been concerned about possible
anticompetitive behavior by large (dominant) multinationals. Both the EU and the US are large economic
entities, with domestic competition authorities that are well-equipped  to address anticompetitive behavior
that has detrimental consequences for consumers located in their jurisdiction. Developing countries will
have less capacity to discipline possible anticompetitive abuses by foreign multinational firms on their
markets. Perhaps the most obvious example are export cartels designed to exploit market power on
foreign markets. Such cartels benefit home countries if any detrimental effect on home consumers is
small and more than offset by the gains to producers associated with their ability to raise prices on foreign
markets. The latter will be to the detriment of foreign welfare if the costs to consumers outweigh the
2  See Fox (1997) and Mavroidis and Neven (1998).
4increase in domestic producer surplus. Developing countries therefore may stand to gain from an
international agreement that outlaws such welfare-reducing  cartels,3 provides for their interests to be
taken into account when large mergers are considered, and provides mechanisms to enforce multilateral
disciplines.
This brief introduction illustrates that there may be significant variation in the interests of
different OECD countries regarding the type of competition disciplines that would be considered
beneficial (acceptable). The main interest of the EU and US is to use competition policy disciplines as an
export-promoting device and to reduce the scope for conflict in the approval of mergers between large
firms; they are less interested in subjecting the behavior of their firms in foreign markets to international
disciplines that will benefit foreign consumers.  Market access is also of interest to small countries, but
these may be concerned as well with being able to invoke assistance in disciplining anticompetitive
behavior of firms located in foreign jurisdictions.
Market Access and Vertical Restraints
The type of market access concerns that arise were recently illustrated in the dispute between
Kodak and Fuji that was brought to the WTO as a so-called "non-violation" complaint under Article
XXIII of the GATT. This allows members to challenge government measures that  "nullify or impair"
trade liberalization commitments even though the measures themselves are not subject to WTO rules
(Hoekman and Mavroidis, 1994). The US alleged that informal administrative guidance, industrial policy
tools applied by Japanese firms themselves, and guidelines on what constituted fair and unfair
competition allegedly deprived Kodak of marketing tools that were of special importance to it as an
outsider. Most directly on the competition front, the US claimed that because Fuji controlled the
distribution system, this allowed it to exclude Kodak from access to film wholesaling networks, obliging
3  Of course,  some small  nations  that are  the home  country  of large  multinational  firms  may benefit  from  the
ability  of such firms  to exercise  market  power  in foreign  markets.
5it to sell directly to retailers, a much less efficient method of market penetration. The key allegation was
thus of an anti-competitive vertical relationship between Fuji and its primary distributors. Japan
responded that the control by Fuji of wholesale networks was irrelevant since most of the retailers they
served also bouglht  imported film and that Kodak's own distribution system amounted to the creation of a
wholesale system of its own, the exclusion from the Fuji system, such as it was, therefore being
irrelevant.
The WTO dispute panel agreed to treat all the "measures" attacked by the US, including
decisions of the Japan Fair Trade Commission regarding the absence of anti-competitive practices by
Fuji, as possible grounds for complaint as they could have affected trade. On examining the facts, it
concluded there was no impairment of US market access rights. The panel investigated claims that
restrictions on certain forms of marketing strategy affected importers disproportionately and concluded
that they did not. They did not see anything in Japanese distribution structures that excluded foreigners as
a result public policy, even on a wide interpretation of this term.  In particular they concluded that:
"single-brand  wholesale distribution  is the common  market structure-indeed  the norm-in  most major
national film markets, including  the US market. While  the United States responds that the US market
structure  was the result of private and not governmental  actions,  it is unclear why the same economic  forces
acting in the United States would not also exist in Japan."(WTO, 1998b, p. 421)
Kodak-Fuji revolved around one of the most sensitive but also most obscure areas of competition
and trade policy: exclusive or selective "vertical" arrangements between upstream and downstream
sellers. These are typically arrangements where a producer gives sole rights to one wholesaler or retailer
in an area, and/or imposes the condition  that anyone handling their goods (or services) must not act for
any other firm. Although the US systematically  accuses Japanese "Keiretsu"  groups of using control of
the wholesale sector to exclude foreign goods, there is no agreement among lawyers or economists about
whether and when such "vertical" arrangements are ever genuinely anti-competitive. This is the key
question, not whether firms from a particular country have a market share they are unhappy with.
6Unfortunately it is often difficult to answer; identifying producer interests is much easier. As a result the
scope for conflict is significant, as firms and governments put zero weight on the welfare or efficiency
dimensions of a given situation existing in a foreign country.
Anotlher  example concerns the treatment of parallel imports, i.e. imports of branded goods bought
in markets where they are cheaper to avoid high price official marketing channels. The EU has criticized
Japan for allowing parallel imports of branded European goods into Japan, allegedly underrnining
expensive distribution networks foreign firms have had to set up. The US Trade Representative has
protested to New Zealand over a law that is based on the principle of international exhaustion and bans
restrictions on parallel imports (Financial Times May 26 1998). The EU, as does the US, applies a policy
of "national" exhaustion (regional in the case of the EU), under which traders have the right to move
goods across internal borders. Distribution arrangements such as exclusive licensing which segment the
internal market are not prohibited, but third parties have the right to move goods across internal borders
after the initial sale of the good has occurred. However, with respect to third markets, firns may prevent
parallel imports or reimports that cross the external frontier. European Commissioner Mario Monti has
recently announced a re-think of this policy (The Economist, February 27, 1999,  p. 72). The treatment of
parallel imports could become an important focal point for future WTO discussions on competition law,
with small countries having an interest in adopting international exhaustion and allowing parallel imports
and large countries (more generally, those with important producers of branded goods and services)
having an interest in getting all countries to apply the principle of national exhaustion (Cottier, 1998).
The Kodak-Fuji case confirmed that government measures, including actions directly or
indirectly linked to competition policy, that foster anti-competitive behavior and exclude rivals can in
principle be challenged at the WTO. However, it also illustrated that the "non-violation" process is an
inherently limited instrument through which to attack the (non-)application of national competition laws.
WTO panels are ill-equipped to investigate competition issues; are limited in the extent to which they can
engage in a process of "discovery"; and even if they have the will to be pro-active, there are no effective
7remedies available (as by definition there is no "violation" of a WTO rule). The main value of bringing
non-violation cases is that it provides a forum in which the facts of the matter can be determined and
assessed-it  is a valuable transparency device (Hoekman and Mavroidis, 1994). Time will tell if other
countries will bring similar cases to the WTO.
Mergers andAcquisitions with International Spillovers
Another potential source of conflict concerns control of mergers. There are basically two somewhat
overlapping sets of interests. Competition authorities want effective leverage over mergers that may have
cross border effects, while firms want to minimize the number of agencies they are accountable to. In
principle, mergers between firms that will have a very high combined market share in markets where they
are not domiciled can be a serious source of concern for a competition  authority. Many global mergers
and alliances have occurred that have been approved  without disputes by the major affected jurisdictions.
But in the recent Boeing-McDonnell  Douglas (MDD) case the US and EU took different views and only
a last minute compromise prevented a serious conflict from erupting. The Boeing-MDD merger involved
two US-based firms whose combined sales in the EU were big enough for the EU Commission to claim
right of scrutiny (something the US authorities did not contest). What was interesting about the case was
that the EU was concerned that certain of Boeing's long-term sole-sourcing contractual arrangements
with airlines risked permanently excluding Airbus if they were not challenged. Thus, the concern was not
that the merger would result in higher prices for aircraft buyers (Mavroidis and Neven, 1998). The issue
was to protect the interests of the only EU competitor of Boeing-MDD.  The EU refused to approve the
merger unless Boeing agreed to not to enforce the sole-sourcing contracts, which in the end it accepted.
The contested arrangements were unrelated to the merger as they involved Boeing and some of its
customers-if  they were bad for the EU, they were bad independent of the merger. This raises the
question why objections were not raised earlier by the EU (or by MDD in the pre-merger period).
8This case illustrates that interests of different jurisdictions can diverge considerably in merger
cases. It suggests there may be value to adoption  of rules to foster transparency, e.g., harmonization of
notification procedures. Less clear is how to address the problem of a number of national authorities
making mutually exclusive demands on a merging entity. For an international agreement to have
prevented a similar dispute or the eventual negotiated  outcome, it would have to impose clear standards
for examination and review of mergers. The EU and the US already cooperate on antitrust matters under
the auspices of a bilateral agreement that includes positive comity language. This was not sufficient to
prevent the dispute. One can question wliethier  international  rules could be devised that would be effective
in requiring any one jurisdiction to back off.
Summing up, efforts to put competition-related issues on the WTO agenda are largely driven by
classic producer interests in major OECD countries, with governments pursuing a traditional "export-
promotion" objective. The primary concern is not.  welfare or efficiency-the  major focus of many
national antitrust regimes. Hence a basic tension exists that leads to the following question: how might an
international agreement on competition policy  that is geared towards dealing with market access
pressures and will be driven by a desire to defend national producer interests help to enhance welfare?
The answer in the case of the trade policy instruments that are at the heart of the GATT is well known-
the pursuit of mercantilist objectives by trade negotiators leads to an outcome that is welfare improving
because it helps governments to overcome the opposition of politically-powerful interest groups that are
able to block unilateral liberalization attempts. The key question in the case of competition policy is
whether a similar dynamic can be set into motion. We return to this below.
3.  Competition Law and Developing Countries
Developing countries have not been at the center of the debate on trade and competition in the WTO.
Many do not have competition laws; those that do, often have limited implementation ability. If
competition law moves on to the WTO agenda, an important question for developing country
9policymakers is what this will imply for their ability to adopt antitrust and competition policies that are in
the national interest. This in turn requires a view on wlhat  is and what is not desirable.
From an economic perspective.,  policy should aim at safeguarding the competitive process so that
finns are able to compete away any excess profits that may exist at any point in time. Trade  economists
believe  that a liberal trade policy stance is the cheapest and most effective  competition  policy instrument
available  to a government. Competition  from imports  is a very important  source of market discipline for
firms. This is the case in particular for countries  with highly concentrated  industrial  structures inherited  from
the past, as the resulting  monopoly  rents may be a major drag on the economy. As the magnitude of trade
restrictions in most developing countries significantly exceeds those that are applied by high income
nations, trade economists tend to argue that priority should continue to be given to reducing traditional
trade barriers. This prescription is strengthened if account is taken of the fact that many sectors are not
tradable-here  priority should be given to allowing entry by foreign multinationals, as FDI will be a
primary source of market discipline. At the same time, as UNCTAD  (1997) points out, it should be
clearly signaled to firms that inward investment that is motivated by the pursuit and eventual abuse of a
dominant position will be dealt with by competition law.
Developing countries are mostly pricetakers  on world markets; outside  of certain natural
resources, their firms generally  have no market power. Even if they do, it is difficult to design and
implement  policies that will shift the terms of trade in a country's favor 4 The international  experience
indicates  that reductions in trade barriers reduce price-cost mark-ups,  especially among large firms. Plant
sizes tend to decline, but the effect on scale efficiency  is generally  modest because  most of the adjustment in
total domestic output comes from large firms that were operating  on the flat portion of their average cost
curves (Roberts and Tybout, 1997).  Trade acts as a conduit for knowledge transmission, and protection
chokes off a necessary ingredient. Similarly, access to foreign intermediate and capital goods is important
4 See, for example, the analysis by De Melo, Olarreaga and Takacs (1999) on the policies used by Madagascar  in an
attempt to exploit it's large share of the global vanilla market.
I0to final goods producers. There is extensive evidence that exporting to knowledgeable buyers in high-
income countries has helped developing country firms acquire global best practices: buyers transmit
blueprints and teach quality control; help organize the shop floor; transmit information about better inputs
available abroad. Technology also transfers through imports of intermediates, capital-goods, and through
de-engineering of imports.
Although  a free trade stance-defined  to include the freedom for foreign firms to establish
(invest)-greatly  reduces the scope for anticompetitive  practices  to be sustainable,  it does not imply that the
need for competition law disappears.  Competition  may be limited to local markets-e.g.,  retail
distribution-and  certain products may be produced  by (natural) monopolies,  by firms with global market
power, or by firms where natural or 'unnatural' (govemment-made)  barriers  to entry restrict contestability.
Recent research has confirmed an old insight that free entry into an industry depends on there being no
scope for an existing dominant firm to "punish" a new entrant by cutting prices when it is attacked. This
will act as a serious deterrent to new entry unless there are no barriers to "exit". That is to say, if a new
firm which finds  a market unprofitable can leave it without losing its initial investment, then the market
will really be effectively open, but if a new entrant risks being stranded in an unprofitable activity it will
fear entry.5
Developing countries should seek to ensure that their competition laws and related
regulations aim at safeguarding the competitive process. Where institutional enforcement capacity is
limited, it is desirable for political structures to do all they can to make conditions as favorable as possible
for pro-competitive behavior, which includes sustaining  free trade and avoiding the creation of
monopolies through perverse regulation or by ill-conceived privatization. This has led many specialists to
recommend that developing countries pursue a broad-based competition policy-defined  to encompass  all
actions govermments  may take to promote competition,  including  trade liberalization,  measures  to facilitate
Much  depends  here  on the specifics  of the technologies  and cost  structures.  In the absence  of sunk  costs,  there
may  be excessive  entry.  Barriers  to entry  may  therefore  be welfare  increasing.
11domestic entry into industry and services, de-monopolization  of sectors, and imposition of hard budget
constraints on public enterprises. Well-managed  privatization  and encouragement  of foreign direct
investment are additional important  dimensions of competition  policy. The key principle underlying  an
active competition policy stance is to rely on market forces to determine  the allocation of productive
resources, subject to the constraint of ensuring that social equity  objectives are realized  as efficiently  as
possibk, and that mechanisms exist  through which attempts  to create monopolies and exploitation  of market
power  can be addressed.
Competition policy, as opposed to competition law, should have as a major priority the
creation of pre-conditions likely to assure the effective functioning  of competition, rather than seeking to
punish violations of the rules. This leads many writers to suggest that competition authorities play a
general "advocacy" role within government, for example trying to oppose trade or other policy measures
that will limit or distort competition, or taking an active part in debates over privatization to ensure that
this does not create conditions for monopolistic  abuse (Boner, 1991; Boner and Krueger, 1995; Kemani
and Dutz, 1995). Of particular importance in this connection is to ensure that legislation  and govemment
regulation  is consistent.  This is a dimension  of competition  policy  that is often neglected but can be vital in
enabling  a country  to maximize the benefits of trade liberalization  and WTO membership.  One often
mentioned example is contingent protection,  where the application  of competition  criteria can help ensure
that intervention does not become excessively  costly to the economy (Hoekman  and Mavroidis, 1996).
Another example is the policy stance  taken towards exhaustion  of IPRs mentioned earlier, including  the
legal status of exclusive geographical  distribution  arrangements  and parallel imports. As far as competition
law narrowly defined is concerned, care should be taken that the legislation  is not captured or abused  by
producer interests. This is a possibility  that should be taken seriously  at the design or drafting stage. The
greater  the number of objectives or constraints  that a competition  authority  is required to take into
consideration,  the higher the likelihood  that the focus of enforcement  efforts will not center primarily on
safeguarding  the competitive  process.
12Parallel imports  and exhaustion  of intellectual  property rights
Before the Uruguay Round, the US periodically  threatened countries with trade penalties under
Section 301 of its trade legislation if they did not enforce patent and copyright rules, even where the
countries  in question had no legal obligation  to do so, not having signed the Paris and Beme Conventions
on the subject. The Uruguay Round TRIPs agreement obliged all WTO members to enforce intellectual
property rights, though with transition periods for developing countries. Whether developing countries
will gain from stronger protection of IPRs is a matter of debate. Those in favor argue that dynamic
benefits resulting from greater incentives for innovation, both at home and abroad, and for owners of
knowledge to license technologies will more than offset any static losses. On balance the short-run impact
of the TRIPs regime is likely to cause a transfer of income from poor to rich countries, with at best
marginal impacts on economic efficiency (Primo Braga, 1996). The scale of the transfer very much
depends on the market structures assumed to exist in the patentable products and the closeness of
availability of substitutes.
The TRIPS agreement explicitly authorized the use of competition policy measures against
abuses of IPRs. As right holders will frequently use their IPRs to segment markets, developing countries
may therefore have a strong interest in applying an international exhaustion rule similar that that applied
within the EU by EC competition policy. This would imply that domestic buyers could purchase patented
and branded products wherever they find the most favorable prices. This is fully compatible with the
TRIPs agreement: Article 40 allows measures to control abuse of IPRs through the application of
competition law (Cottier and Meitinger, 1998). Thus, even though both the EU and the US are active
proponents of a national and regional approach in this area, respectively, there is no presumption that
other countries should also follow this route.
The economics of this issue are complex. Many experts argue that as long as a producer faces
competition from other brands exclusive arrangements do not matter. But in many developing countries
13the major brands may all be in the hands of one entity or a defacto cartel. In the absence of competition
law enforcement, national exhaustion and legally enforceable exclusive distributor arrangements can then
have a major detrimental impact on welfare. 6 Even if there is vigorous inter-brand competition, whether
to adopt international exhaustion should be a matter for national authorities to decide independently. The
implementation of the TRIPs agreement affords an opportunity to consider the intimate linkages between
intellectual property protection, trade liberalization, and competition policy (Maskus, 1998). Hong
Kong's recent experience is illustrative. Enforcement of TRIPs-type protection of IPRs led to the
exclusion of gray market parallel imports and allegations of abuse of a dominant position, which the
Hong Kong government has generally not worried about given its free trade stance. The Director-General
of the Department responsible for enforcing the IP law recognizes that the absence of a competition law
creates potential problems, but notes that his job is to protect the interests of rights holders; "someone
else must protect the others" (Financial Times, Jan 8., 1999).
To recapitulate, developing countries have an interest in adopting strong competition policies, the
main pillar of which should be a liberal trade and FDI policy stance. Competition law is required to
ensure markets are contestable, especially in nontradable sectors. It also has a role to play in controlling
anticompetitive practices, which as Adam Smith already noted over two centuries ago, businessmen will
always have an incentive to pursue. Antitrust legislation may also be required to maximize the benefits
(or minimize the costs) of certain WTO agreements, the TRIPs agreement being one example,
antidumping being another (see below). That said, competition law is not a panacea. Enforcement is
neither costless nor simple, and can impose a great deal of uncertainty on firms if it is not clearly defined
6  An anecdote  is illustrative.  Lebanon  has an exclusive  distribution  law  that  gives  agents  the right  to request
Customs  to block entry  of "nonauthorized"  goods.  On a trip in Germany  a businessman  buys  a batch  of
second-hand  dentist  chairs  made  by Siemens  from  a university,  which  had used  them  for  training  purposes.  On
import  into  Lebanon,  the shipment  was  blocked  because  the Siemens  agent  had  not approved  it. In the end  the
businessman  was obliged  to pay the agent  a large  fee and was  forced  to pay customs  duty  on the chairs  on the
basis  of the value  of new chairs,  in effect  wiping  out his anticipated  profit.
14and enforced consistently. This is an important reason why liberal trade and FDI (establishment) policies
should be a primary pillar of a government's competition policy stance.
4.  International Agreement: Developing Country Interests
While a vigorous competition policy will be beneficial for developing countries, this can be implemented
unilaterally. What is the rationale for a multilateral agreement? For an international agreement  to be
beneficial, it must either offset an externality imposed by policies of other countries or help governments
to overcome domestic political economy constraints  that impede the adoption of welfare enhancing policy
chaniges.  The market access and merger control issues that dominate the agenda of major OECD
countries are largely irrelevant for developing countries. Insofar as there are market access impediments
resulting from anticompetitive behavior by incumbent firms, this can and should be dealt with by
domestic competition authorities. Of course, in many countries institutional  weaknesses may impede this,
but that is a matter for technical and finanicial  assistance that will not be solved by the adoption of
international disciplines.
The merger issue is clearly of interest to developing countries who may suffer from the increased
market power and reduction in competition that results from a merger of two or more "global" firms.
They would benefit from rules requiring home country competition authorities to take the interests of
third parties into account. This also applied to the more general potential problem for developing
countries of being confronted with export cartels and analogous  arrangements that reduce national
welfare (the sum of consumer and producer surplus). This can be a major externality-related rationale for
an international agreement on competition law. An agreement that would make export cartels illegal
would likely be beneficial for developing nations, but may also be quite difficult to achieve. A
precondition will be to define and agree on what is and what is not acceptable. Even for importing
countries it is not necessarily the case that restrictive practices are detrimental to national welfare. The
fact that it proved impossible to agree to ban export cartels in the OECD suggests agreement may be
15difficult to obtain (OECD, 1998). For large OECD countries, any agreement to make binding
commitments to follow a positive comity rule in mergers (let alone agree on common standards of
review) and to prohibit export cartels (or even to agree to provide information)  will imply costs insofar as
the practices concerned do not have a detrimental effect on home country welfare. They can therefore be
expected to demand a significant quidpro quo of developing countries. one that may go beyond a general
willingness to adopt and enforce competition legislation.
The political economy argument in favor of international competition disciplines is that external
disciplines might prove helpful to overcome domestic opposition  to the implementation of pro-
competitive policies. As noted previously, the foundation of the GATT and the WTO is that in the pursuit
of a market access agenda the national welfare is promoted. National antitrust has a very different focus
from national trade policy in that the emphasis is (should be) on welfare and the competitive process.
This implies that the economic rationale for putting it on the WTO agenda is much weaker than for trade
policy-national  authorities should already be engaged in combating anti-competitive business practices.
The pursuit of a market access agenda may result in outcomes that are detrimental from a welfare point of
view (tlhe  latter possibility is a major reason some competition authorities are leery of putting antitrust on
the WTO agenda, see e.g., Marsden (1997)). For the WTO dynamic to "work" one must start from the
presumption that competition law and policy in developing countries has been or will be captured by
domestic producer lobbies, and therefore does not focus on welfare maximization. If so, and this may
indeed be the case in some cases, there would be a rationale for pursuing international competition
disciplines in the WTO. The problem remains, however, that the WTO process is driven by export
interests (market access), not national welfare considerations, and there is no assurance that the rules that
will proposed or agreed will be welfare enhancing. Increasing access to markets may have this effect, but
there is no presumption that this will always be the result, especially in contexts where firms are actively
seeking to create and defend rents. Doubts can therefore be expressed regarding the ability of a WTO-
16based process to play as constructive a role in the area of competition law as it does in the area of trade
policy.
5.  Assessing the Options
Various criteria can be used to evaluate the desirability of alternative options for a WTO agreement in the
area of competition law. From an economic perspective the key criterion is the likely impact on national
welfare (economic efficiency) of WTO members. An attempt to identify the major options is made in
Table 1, with a + sign indicating a positive impact on welfare, a-  sign a negative impact, and a 0
indicating no impact. Not surprisingly, in most cases a range of outcomes is possible. Space constraints
prohibit an extensive discussion of the various options-see,  e.g., EU (1995, 1996), Scherer (1994),
Hoekman and Mavroidis (1995), Hindley (1996), Graham and Richardson (1997), Hoekman (1997),
WTO (1997), Lloyd (1998), and Richardson (1998).
Table 1: Assessing the Options
Option  National
welfare
1. Minimum substantive standards of antitrust law  + /-
2. Expand the scope to bring nonviolation complaints  + /-
3. Introduce antitrust criteria in antidumping  +
4. Give a greater transparency and "discovery" role to the WTO  +
5. Prohibit export "cartels"  +/-
6. Adopt procedural and due process norms  +/0
Note: + indicates positive impact, - a negative impact, and 0 no impact. More than one symbol indicates
a range of outcomes is possible.
Harmonization of substantive law is in our view not desirable, and not enforceable in any
event without a supra-national body. Most of the conflicts among OECD countries concern vertical
restrictions, and there is no agreement if and when these are detrimental. The Chicago School of
17economists would hold that vertical restraints can almost never be harmful. Others argue that vertical
restraints can exacerbate other market imperfections  especially with asymmetric information. US courts
therefore use a rule of reason approach, as the costs and benefits must be assessed on a case-by-case
basis. Given the absence of a consensus, we are doubtful about any substantive international regime
forcing the acceptance of one set of rules rather than another. And, as pointed out by many scholars, even
if identical language were to be adopted in different  jurisdictions, interpretations and decisions could
easily differ depending on the weights put on various factors by national authorities (Fox, 1998).
Use of nonviolation dispute settlement might be facilitated by seeking agreement that non-
enforcement of national antitrust law is a government  "measure" and weakening the requirement that the
measure was not "reasonably" foreseeable at the time the trade concessions were negotiated (Hindley,
1996). While this may expand the willingness to invoke this procedure, a problem that remains is that the
remedies that may be suggested by a WTO panel cannot affect the national application of antitrust law-
at best a complainant country will be offered compensation. This is unlikely to satisfy the firm that
brought the complaint and thus to defuse conflicts.
The likelihood of disciplining antidumping through the introduction of competition law
criteria-an  often proposed option in the literature (e.g., Hoekman and Mavroidis, 1996)-is  not high, to
say the least, even though it would be welfare-improving. There are powerful lobbies that support the
maintenance of antidumping. Moreover it is clear that the aim of anti-dumping is not the same as that of
competition policy: one protects domestic firms (competitors), the other protects the competitive process.
Recent free trade agreements illustrate the strength of the antidumping lobbies. The instrument continues
to apply in NAFTA. Association Agreements involving the EU as a partner reveal that a commitment to
apply common disciplines in areas such as antitrust, state aids, and state monopolies, and to adopt the
whole of the EU's internal market rules is necessary to induce the EU to abolish the reach of antidumping
oni  intra-regional trade. This was achieved in the case of the European Economic Area agreement, but not
18yet in any other. Disciplining antidumping is an issue for national constituencies to deal with; a necessary
first step is to recognize that antidumping is straightforward  protection (Finger, 1993).
Strengthening the WTO's transparency mandate to include information on the competition
policy stance applied by governments could be beneficial. More data on the economic effects of
government policies would be useful to affected domestic groups; it would also provide incentives for the
establishment of domestic counterpart institutions.  The latter is particularly important for developing
countries. Domestic "transparency institutions" and competition  agencies have long been promoted by
trade policy and competition analysts who argue that public information on the costs and benefits of
government policies is required in order to countervail rent-seeking activities (see e.g., Finger, 1982,
Boner and Krueger, 1995). There are nontrivial issues that arise from a multilateral surveillance
perspective. Competition enforcement is an expost endeavor, and the "state of competition" is inherently
difficult if not impossible to "quantify"-there  are no tariff equivalents to be calculated. Nonetheless,
basic cross-country data on entry and exit (turnover), the number of firms in a market and their size
distribution, import penetration, the share of FDI in total assets by industry, etc. can provide useful
indicators of the state of competition and trends over time, and may be helpful in identifying possible
"outliers" (Djankov and Hoekman, 1998).
Developing countries may benefit from export cartels involving their firms, and these benefits
may outweigh the costs associated with imports controlled by foreign export cartels. Whether or not a
country will gain from a ban on export cartels depends on the balance between its ability to exploit
market power on world markets by restricting supply and the extent to which it is confronted  with such
behavior on the part of other countries. On balance, it seems more likely that developing countries will
confront the second situation more frequently, and may not have the ability to address such practices
through national enforcement of competition law. Whether much progress can be made to ban export
cartels is open to question, however. The US in 1997 proposed a voluntary agreement in the context of
the OECD that would commit members to prosecute "hard-core cartels" that operate across more than
19one market to raise prices or restrict sales. The suggested agreement would do no more than
"recommend" that countries "should" enforce their existing laws more strongly. It would tolerate any
arrangements currently lawful, and thus would not address export cartels based in one country selling to
others, or importer cartels that keep out foreign goods.
Finally, an agreement that imposes "procedural" norms for the implementation and enforcement
of competition laws (agreement to adopt a competition law; notification and transparency provisions,
"due process", legal assistance and procedural cooperation; adoption of the principle of positive comity)
could also be beneficial. Although many developing countries have antitrust legislation, and many more
are considering its introduction, enforcement may be uncertain or inconsistent. Procedural cooperation
would also allow authorities in developing countries to request the assistance of counterparts in OECD
countries and to consider their interests in the application of competition law. In the case of conflicts, the
WTO could provide a mechanism for consultations and the exchange of information. 7
Summing up, any agreement on international competition policy that goes beyond general
procedural cooperation and introduction of transparency mechanisms is likely to have be plurilateral, at
least initially. The divergence in interests between WTO members is large, and commitments to
undertake any significant harmonization of substantive  norms (such as banning export cartels, the
treatment of mergers, policy towards parallel imports, etc.) can be expected to require substantial cross-
issue linkages. The terms of any feasible deal are impossible to predict. But any deal involving a
commitment by developing countries to adopt substantive competition rules would have to be
accompanied by significant concessions from the demandeurs that they are not willing or able to offer on
a general basis.
7  Sere  Fox (1998),  Graharn  and  Richardson  (1997)  and  Richardson  (1998)  for  discussions  of options  revolving
around  procedural  cooperation  and  transparency.
206.  Conclusions
Competition  policy has an important  role to play in developing  countries, both in promoting a competitive
environment  and in building and sustaining  public support  for a pro-competitive  policy stance  by the
govemment.  Liberal trade and investment  policies are of vital importance  in fostering competition,  and
priority should be given eliminating barriers  to trade and FDI. However, in many sectors of the economy the
threat of foreign competition  will remain limited, and there is need to apply competition  law to ensure that
firms do not behave collusively and that market  power is not exploited.  Competition  legislation is also
required to allow countries  to combat the possible anticompetitive  implications  of certain WTO agreements.
TRIPs is one example, antidumping  another.  While a multilateral  agreement  to apply competition  criteria
and tests in the antidumping  context will be opposed  by major users, nothing  constrains  a nation  from doing
this on a unilateral  basis.
The desirability  of increased  voluntary international  cooperation  in the area of competition  law,
which may be bilateral (e.g. EU-US) or plurilateral,  must be distinguished  from attempts to agree on binding
multilateral  disciplines.  In principle, a commitment  to more thorough policing  by industrial countries of their
own exporters,  of global  strategic alliances  (e.g. in  telecoms), and import-competing  industries' use of
instruments of contingent protection  could have very general benefits for developing  countries.  However, in
the present environment  there are unlikely to be substantial  benefits for developing countries from any
feasible multilateral agreement  on competition  law.  The problem is that the agenda is likely to be
dominated by market access issues more than international  antitrust. That is to say that the typical dispute
is about the interests of major producers in export markets, and not about ensuring the adoption of
competition law that is in the interests of the economy as a whole. To oversimplify, trade officials from
exporting countries want to force competition  officials in importing countries to assist in opening
markets. From a bureaucratic politics point of view, this can give rise to a conflict between competition or
anti-monopoly authorities worldwide and trade officials. The competition officials are afraid that their
21main objective of defending economic efficiency may be made subordinate to trade officials whose aim is
to promote exports.
Independent  decisions and actions are required  on the part of developing  countries to ensure that
competition  policies are implemented  that foster a liberal  trade and investment  regime, and that action can be
taken under competition  law statutes to ensure  that markets  are contestable.  Multilateral surveillance  and
scrutiny of domestic  competition  policy  may help in this regard,  as it will support domestic "transparency"
activities  that focus attention  on the competitive  conditions  that prevail in the economy. If there is a move to
negotiate on competition  law at the WTO, the challenge  for developed as well as developing  countries is to
pull off the same trick that lies at the heart of the GATT,  namely harnessing  the interests  of competing
producers to promote  the adoption  of policies that are welfare enhancing.  How can the desire of firms for
market access be made compatible with the need to ensure the markets they enter become and remain
competitive,  without imposing  unreasonable  administrative  burdens?
The EU wants to oblige all WTO members to have  someform of competition  law. It is
inconceivable  that there could be agreement on precise formulations:  there would surely be enough interests
to veto a precise set of vertical rules for example. Developing  countries should use the occasion of the EU
proposal to put their interests  on the table, recognizing  that thequidpro quo they can expect will depend
importantly on what they are willing to offer. Clearly there is scope for bargaining outside  the area of
competition  law. The fact that the competition  agenda is being driven by market access considerations  does
not mean this is the only factor that could enter into play. Pressure for modifications  in anti-dumping law
and for commitments by OECD competition  authorities  to provide assistance  to developing  country
competition  authorities  are examples  of the type of quidpro quo that could be sought. Realism suggests,
however,  that the primary focus should be on the design of appropriate  national policies.  Developing
countries should use the opportunities offered  by the WTO to implement  a pro-active, broad-based
competition  policy stance as this is in their own interest,  while seeking all the leverage they can to  increase
the contestability of world markets.
22References
Boner, Roger. 1995. "Competition Policy and Institutions in Reforming Economies," in C. Fritschak
(ed.) Regulatory Policies and Reform: A Comparative  Analysis.  Washington D.C.: The World Bank.
Boner, Roger and Reinald Krueger.  1991. The  Basics ofAntitrust Policy: A Review of Ten Nations and
the European Communities. Washington D.C.: World Bank Technical Working Paper No. 160.
Cottier, Thomas. 1998. "The WTO System and Exhaustion of Rights," presented at the Committee on
International Trade Law conference on Exhaustion of Intellectual Property Rights and Parallel
Importation in World Trade, November 6-7, Geneva.
Cottier, Thomas and Ingo Meitinger.  1998. "The TRIPs Agreement Without a Competition
Agreement?," presented at the Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei workshop Trade and Competition in the
WTO and Beyond, Venice, Dec. 4-5.
De Melo, Jaime, Marcelo Olarreaga and Wendy Takacs. 1999. "Pricing Policy Under
Double Market  Power: Madagascar  and the international  vanilla  market,"  Review of
Development  Economics,  forthcoming.
Djankov, Simeon and Bernard Hoekman. 1998.  "Conditions of Competition and Multilateral
Surveillance," The World  Economy, 21:1109-28.
European Commission. 1995. "Competition policy in the new trade order strengthening international
cooperation and rules," Report of the group of experts, July ("Van Miert Report").
European Commission. 1996. "Towards an International Framework of Competition Rules,"
Communication  to Council, Com (96) 284, June 18.
Finger, J. Michael. 1982.  "Incorporating the Gains from Trade into Policy," World Economy, 5:367-77.
Finger, J. Michael (ed.).  1993. Antidumping.  Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Fox, Eleanor. 1997. "Toward World Antitrust and Market Access," American Journal of International
Law, 91:1-25.
Fox, Eleanor.  1998. "International Antitrust: Against Minimum Rules; For Cosmopolitan Principles,"
The Antitrust Bulletin, 43:5-20.
Graham, E. and J.D. Richardson, 1997. Global Competition Policies: An Agenda. Washington DC:
Institute for International Economics.
Hindley, Brian.  1996.  "Competition Law and the WTO: Alternative Structures for Agreement," in
Jagdish Bhagwati and Robert Hudec (eds.), Fair Trade and Harmonization. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Hoekinan, Bernard. 1997.  "Competition Policy and the Global Trading System," The World Economy,
20: 383-406.
23Hoekman, Bernard and Petros C. Mavroidis.  1994. "Competition, Competition Policy and the GATT,"
WorldEconomy,  17:121-150.
Hoekman, Bernard and Petros C. Mavroidis.  1996. "Dumping, Antidumping and Antitrust," Journal of
World  Trade, 30:27-52.
Holmes, Peter.  1996. "Competition Policy and Integration: Leveling or Tilting the Playing Field,"
Global Economic Institutions Working Paper Series No. 21.
Holmes, P. et al. 1997. "International Competition Policy: the Long March to the WTO," ESRC, mimeo.
Janow, Merit.  1998. "Unilateral and Bilateral Approaches  to Competition Policy Drawing on Trade
Experience," in R. Lawrence (ed.), Brookings Trade Forum, 1998. Washington DC: Brookings
Institution.
Khemani, R. Shyam and Mark Dutz.  1995. "The Instruments of Competition Policy and Their
Relevance for Economic Development," in C. Frischtak (ed.) Regulatory Policies and Reform.:  A
Comparative  Analysis.  Washington  D.C.: The World Bank.
Klein, Joel. 1995. "International Antitrust: a Justice Department Perspective", Speech to Fordham
Corporate Law Institute, New York City, October 26.
Klein, Joel.  1998. "No Monopoly on Antitrust," Financial Times, February 13, p. 24.
Lloyd, Peter. 1998. "Multilateral Rules for International Competition Law?," The World Economy,
21:1029-49.
Marsden P. 1997. " Dealing with International Exclusion: The Right Focus for the WTO Working Group
on Trade and Competition Policy," World Competition.
Maskus, Keith. 1998. "The International Regulation of Intellectual Property," Weltwirtschaftliches
Archiv.
Mavroidis, Petros C. and Damien Neven.  1998. "Some Reflections on Extraterritoriality in International
Economic Law," mimeo.
OECD.  1998. Recommendation of the Council concerning effective action against hard core cartels.
Paris: OECD, May.
Primo Braga, Carlos.  1996..  Trade Related Intellectual Property Issues: the Uruguay Round and its
Economic Implications," in W. Martin and L.A. Winters (eds.),  The Uruguay  Round and the Developing
Countries Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Richardson, J. David. 1998. "Multilateralizing Conventions," in R. Lawrence (ed.), Brookings Trade
Forum, 1998. Washington DC: Brookings Institution.
Roberts, Mark and James Tybout (eds.).  1997. Industrial Evolution in Developing Countries. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
24Scherer, F. M.  1994. Competition Policies for an Integrated World  Economy. Washington D.C.:
Brookings Institution.
UNCTAD. 1997. World Investment Report. Geneva: UN.
WTO. 1997.  Annual Report: Trade and Competition,  Geneva: WTO
WTO. 1  998a. Working Group on the Interaction between Trade and Competition Policy, Report to the
General Council, Dec 8.
WTO. l 998b. "Japan: Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper," Panel Report,
March.
25Policy Research  Working  Paper Series
Title  Author  Date  for  )aner
WPS2187  Who  Determines  Mexican  Trade  Jean-Marie  Grether  September  1999  L.Tabada
Policy?  Jaime  de Melo  36896
WPS2188  Financial  Liberalization  and  the  Pedro  Alba  September  1999  R. Vo
Capital  Account:  Thailand,  1988-97  Leonardo  Hernandez  33722
Daniela  Klingebiel
WPS2189  Alternative  Frameworks  for  Stijn  Claessens  September  1999  R. Vz
Providing  Financial  Services  Daniela  Klingebiel  33722
WPS2190  The  Credit  Channel  at Work:  Lessons Giovanni  Ferri  September  1999  K. ILabrie
from  the Republic  of Korea's  Financial Tae  Soo  Kang  31001
Crisis
WPS2191  Can No  Antitrust  Policy  Be  Better  Aaditya  Mattoo  September  1999  L. Tabada
Than  Some  Antitrust  Policy?  368°6
WPS2192 Districts,  Spillovers,  and Government Reza  Baqir  September  1999  S. Devadas
Overspending  87891
WPS2193 Children's  Growth  and Poverty  in  Michele  Gragnolati  September  1999  M. GrasncGat.
Rural  Guatemala  85287
WPS2194 Does  Democracy  Facilitate  the  Jean-Jacques  Dethier  October  1999  H.  Ghanem
Economic  Transition?  An Empirical  Hafez  Ghanem  85557
Study  of Central  and Eastern  Europe  Edda  Zoli
and  the Former  Soviet  Union
WPS2195  Aggregating  Governance  Indicators  Daniel  Kaufmann  October  1999  D. Souvet
Aart Kraay  35818
Pablo  Zoido-Lobat6n
WPS2196  Governance  Matters  Daniel  Kaufmann  October  1999  D. Bouvet
Aart  Kraay  3581i  8
Pablo  Zoido-Lobat6n
WPS2197  Production  Sharing  in East Asia:  Francis  Ng  October  1999  L.  Tabada
Who  Does  What  for Whom,  and  Why?  Alexander  Yeats  36896
WPS2198  How  the Chinese  System  of Charges  Hua  Wang  October  1999  H.  'ar3
and Subsidies  Affects  Pollution  Ming  Chen  3325
Control  Efforts  by China's  Top
Industrial  Polluters
WPS2199  Managing  Risks  of Capital  Mobility  Mansoor  Dailami  October  1999  W. Nedrov,
316  b5
WPS2200  The Role of Trust in Financial Sector  Biagio Bossone  October 1999  E. iv;!eknovQ
Development  8  -5Policy  Research Working  Paper  Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS2201 Financiai  Development  and Industrial EBiagio  Bossone  October  1999  E. Mekhova
Capital  Accumulation  85984
WPS2202  Soecialization  without  Regret:  Michael  R. Carter  October  1999  M. Fernandez
Transfer  Rights,  Agricultural  Yang  Yao  33766
Productivity,  and Investment  in an
industrializing  Economy
WPS2203 Market  versus  Administrative  Mlichael  R.  Carter  October  1999  M. Fernandez
Realiocation  of Agricultural  Land  Yang  Yao  33766
in a Period  of Rapid  Industrialization
WPS2204  Corruption  under  Moral  Hazard  Gunnar  S. Eskeland  October  1999  H. Sladovich
Henrik  Thiele  37698
WPS2205  Foreign-Owned  Capital  and  N1arcelo  Olarreaga  October  1999  L.  Tabada
E  ndoaenous  Tariffs  36896
WPS2206  Household  Childcare  Choices  and  Michael  M. Lokshin  October  1999  P. Sader
Women's  WVork  Behavior  in Russia  33902
W41PS2207  Jamaica's  Food  Stamp  Program:  Kene  Ezemenari  October  1999  G. Peralta
Impacts  on Poverty  and  Welfare  Kalanidhi  Subbarao  37405
WPS2208  Ethnic  Partition  as a Solution  to  Nicholas  Sambanis  October  1999  H. Sladovich
Ethnic  War:  An Empirical  Critique  37698
of  the Theoretical  Literature
WPS2209 Does  Corruption  Relieve  Foreign  Shang-Jin  Wei  October  1999  H. Sladovich
Investors  of the Burden  of Taxes  37698
and Capital  Controls?
WPS2210  The  Sliperry  Slope:  Explaining  the  F'ancisco  H. G. Ferreira  October  1999  G. llogon
increase in Extreme  Poverty  in Urban Ricardo  Paes  de Barros  33732
Brazil,  1976-96